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Abstract: Within its own borders, the European Union (EU) is certainly a peace 
project. However, its external security and stability imperative does not make it a 
peacebuilding project in the neighbourhood and beyond by default. The official EU 
institutions have political and conceptual limitations that prevent them from 
meaningfully engaging with and addressing state formation conflicts.  This paper 
addresses the disconnect between the European Union and the civil society operating in 
the field of peacebuilding at the level of theories of change underlying policies, 
strategies and activities with the aim of transforming and resolving conflicts. Theories 
of change are elicited from the reflections and experiences of CSOs and from the main 
documents that concern conflicts and peacebuilding in the European Neighbourhood. It 
proposes a new framework for the forecast and assessment of the impact of CSOs on 
peacebuilding, which can be considered by the EU institutions for building strategic 
partnerships with international and local civil society to enhance conflict transformation 
in the European Neighbourhood. 
                                                 





Within its own borders, the European Union (EU) is certainly a peace project. Its 
internal security agenda requires stability in the neighbourhood immediately abutting it 
to the south and to the east.  These areas have a substantial number of acute protracted 
conflicts and the risk of the ignition of latent conflicts cannot be neglected there. The 
EU’s external security and stability imperative, however, does not make it a 
peacebuilding project in the neighbourhood and beyond by default.  
 
The official EU institutions have political and conceptual limitations that prevent them 
from meaningfully engaging with and addressing state formation conflicts.  These 
include an inability to engage with the unrecognized entities.  There are also 
fundamental tensions between the desire to put pressure on the states that systematically 
violate individual and collective rights and the need to ally with the same governments 
to cope with the security threats.  A tricky interplay between the Idealpolitik in the 
declarations of intent and the Realpolitik in the implementation of foreign and security 
policy leaves the essential aspects of the conflicts in question largely unaddressed.  The 
lack of in-house expertise on the state of the art in the field of conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding negatively affects the operation and the image of the EU in the 
conflict areas. Nevertheless the respective European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
Action Plans promise support for conflict resolution, which raises certain expectations. 
 
There is a need for the EU to shift from the generic schemes of the Europeanization of 
the polities and economies in the Neighbourhood as an implicit road map to peaceful 
conflict resolution towards fine tuned and explicit peacebuilding strategies. Partnership 
with civil society organizations (CSOs) that professionalize in the field at all stages and 
levels of conflict interventions is crucial to make this shift.  In the EU documents and 
declarations involvement of civil society in peacebuilding is regarded as vital. However 
there is lack of recognition that conflict transformation and peacebuilding by civil 
society requires a distinct conceptual basis, a specific support structure and a relevant 
impact assessment that may not be in line with the conventional project-based or 
activity-based planning and evaluation of the performance of CSOs, and generic and 
schematic support for civil society.  
 
The present paper addresses the disconnect between the EU and the civil society 
operating in the field of peacebuilding at the level of theories of change underlying  
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policies, strategies and activities with the aim of transforming and resolving conflicts. 
Theories of change are elicited from the reflections and experiences of CSOs both 
internal and external that operate in the conflict settings in the European 
Neighbourhood. Theories of change in use by the EU are reconstructed from the main 
documents that concern conflicts and peacebuilding in the European Neighbourhood.  
 
The theories of change identified as being in use by CSOs and the EU are juxtaposed 
and analyzed against the backdrop of the specific class of state formation conflicts, on 
the one hand, and institutional capacity of the CSOs to be change agents, on the other, 
by way of laying groundwork for a new specialized framework for the forecast and 
assessment of the impact of CSOs on peacebuilding. Conceptually, the framework 
proposed in this paper builds on the peace as change versus peace as stability approach 
and on the notion of civil society as an institutional basis for peacebuilding. This 
framework can be considered by the EU institutions for building strategic partnerships 
with international and local civil society to enhance conflict transformation in the 
European Neighbourhood. 
 
1. EU support for civil society and peacebuilding: do these universes cross? 
The states and regions east and south of the new European borders are home to state 
formation conflicts (Wallenstein, 2002) that are characterized by a clash between 
minorities’ aspirations to re-define the international borders and achieve statehood and 
the existing States’ (and majorities’) determination to preserve the existing nation-states 
within their internationally recognized territories. There is no straightforward solution 
under international law for resolving these conflicts due to the clash between the 
principles of the inviolability of state borders and of the right for self-determination of 
people. The conflicts in question have lasted from fifteen to over forty years, are marked 
by one or several wars and smaller scale violence, isolation of the rival societies from 
each other, asymmetry in the international recognition of the entities in conflict and 
degree of the involvement of the external states as primary, secondary or third parties. 
Given their duration and defining role in the development of the polities and societies in 
question, these conflicts can be defined as protracted, deeply-rooted conflicts that 
require substantial political change within the rival polities along with profound changes 
in the collective self of the societies in conflict for their transformation. Peace processes 
at the official level have not borne fruit in any case, although the intensity of 
negotiations, number of breakthroughs and relapses into war, length of stagnation  
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periods and degree of activity and intrusiveness of the third parties varies across the 
cases. 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed in 2003 as a “soft power” 
foreign policy approach that in essence means to “get others to want what you want” 
(Nye 2004: 256). It is important to emphasize that the ENP Action Plans first and 
foremost are about the EU security that can be ensured through cooperation between the 
EU and the selected partners in the Neighbourhood. Since the enlargement of the EU 
beyond its current eastern and southern borders is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable 
future or ever, its security concerns related to the unresolved conflicts and other threats 
emanating from the Neighbourhood to the east and to the south needed to be addressed 
in an effective way, but with no “accession carrot”. Commitment to the promotion of 
conflict resolution is expressed in the general ENP declarations (Commission 2004). A 
more or less elaborate strategy to be pursued by the EU and by the ENP partners that are 
conflict parties can be found in the respective Action Plans and other ENP country-
specific documents. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which 
defines the funding and implementation of the ENP, however, does not make reference 
to support for conflict transformation in the European Neighborhood (European Council 
and European Parliament 2006).  
 
I argue that the EU does not have real leverage
2 that hypothetically could have 
influenced state leaderships’ and the societies’ motivation to revisit and adjust their own 
positions in favour of an illusory solution of questionable sustainability prospects in the 
absence of the membership “carrot”. The national (or nationalist) agendas seem to have 
had stronger appeal for the polities and societies caught in the state formation conflict. 
                                                 
2 Generally the EU strongly encourages the states that wish to join in to settle frontier disputes, conflicts 
with neighbours and minority issues. This requirement was implicit in the Copenhagen criteria and 
explicitly stated in the decisions of the Essen council in 1995. However, after the accession of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the association and eventual membership prospects delineated for Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Serbia where the conflicts were resolved by the parties (Bosnia) or the solution was imposed 
(Kosovo-Serbia), but peace is “negative” and fragile, the EU integration “carrot” can be regarded as an 
incentive for peacebuilding rather than the award for having achieved lasting peace within and between 
the aspiring countries. The power of conditionality has been questioned when the strategy to stimulate the 
resolution of the conflict with the help of the actualized membership has failed in Cyprus and The 
Republic of Cyprus became a member without having resolved the conflict. The factor of the EU having 
granted Turkey  candidate status has certainly eased the Greece-Turkey tension over Cyprus, but had little 
impact on the intra-Cyprus process. Eventually EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus may indirectly 
affect the rapprochement of the two parts of the island predominantly because of economic 
considerations. However the progress in the Cyprus conflict transformation to date can be attributed to 
other factors, such as the opening of the border, economic incentives for Northern Cyprus to reach out, 




Institutionalized democracy in the realm of elections and political pluralism, for 
example, is not an antidote for ethnic outbidding in the societies that have been and still 
are involved a nationalist conflict. Neither is democracy incompatible with militarism: a 
democratic society can opt for a war as a means to pursue national interests or for self-
defense. The overall optimism of the liberal peace paradigm that the EU bases its 
external policies on should not obscure the need to make strategic adjustments in the 
environment of unfinished statebuilding, frustrated national identities and persisting 
insecurity.  
 
Civil society organizations along with other non-governmental sectors, like the media, 
academia, business and religious institutions are critical internal agents of the change-
from-within. They are well positioned to creatively blend democratization of the society 
and polity and peacebuilding to ensure that the two intervention strands do not cancel 
each other out
3. Civil society worldwide has accumulated the most innovative and 
cutting edge approaches to conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation and the know how in the design and implementation of peacebuilding 
initiatives and processes. New ideas for peacebuilding strategies, solution options and 
peace process formats emerge and are tested and rectified in the realm of civil society. 
Some of these ideas further inform the domestic and international official peacebuilding 
agenda. Local civil society is best positioned to lead its own society towards the 
elimination of cultural violence. It is a very much needed partner for the EU and other 
international interveners in the eradication of structural violence. It deals with the 
consequences of direct violence by mediating for hostage and prisoners of war release 
and exchange, anti-war campaigning and non-violent resistance, and by contributing to 
the prevention and cessation of armed hostilities through creating safe spaces and 
effective processes for negotiations. CSOs that work on the ground ensure sustainability 
of conflict transformation that is at the heart of peacebuilding. It is the role of the local 
civil society to build relationships between conflict parties at all levels, including at the 
highest political level.  
 
The development of civil society is stated as a distinct goal within the ENP (European 
Council and European Parliament 2004). In turn, strengthening of the local civil society 
                                                 
3 For the purpose of the present study the contribution of the Tracks between II and IX (Diamond and 
McDonald 1996) sectors into peacebuilding is regarded as their civil society role and analyzed at the level 




is presented as crucially important for the success of the conflict resolution agenda of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
4. However there is no theory in the 
respective EU documents that links the general strengthening of civil society with the 
enhancement of its peacebuilding capacity except for vague declarations, such as “by 
virtue of their support for the development of civil society and democracy, NGOs are 
key actors in long-term conflict prevention”
5. The fact that conflict prevention has not 
been an explicit reference in the EU financing instruments
6 until very recently was 
creating an obstacle to the design and implementation of the targeted support for 
peacebuilding by civil society. Since the second issue has already been addressed (see 
Conclusion) I will dwell on the first issue, namely, the vagueness and groundlessness of 
the framework that links support for civil society with its peacebuilding effect. I will 
also put forward a proposition that provides a possible explanation for the EU 
minimalist engagement with civil society in the area of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding that favours projects of “low risk and low opportunities” (Hoffman 2004) 
and blocks realization of the professional peacebuilding expertise of CSOs.  
 
The ENP framework of conflict transformation that could be reconstructed from the 
Action Plans and other ENP documents originates from the Idealpolitik paradigm of 
international relations and international peace. The essence of this paradigm is that a 
country’s internal policy and institutions define its foreign policy and that the closer the 
two countries are in their values, political regimes and level of economic development, 
the smaller the probability of a war between them. The liberal peace paradigm that is a 
derivative of the broader Idealpolitik prescribes that that consolidation of democracy 
and rule of law in the domestic policy of the country of concern is the best guarantee for 
this country’s peaceful relations with the external world (Kober, 1990). If treated as a 
democracy-peace hypothesis rather than the axiom (Walensteen, 2002) the liberal peace 
paradigm appears as a generic and not well substantiated basis for the design and 
implementation of policies and programs.  
                                                 
4 Commission (2006a)  
5 Commission (2001)  
6 The court case that was brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the European 
Commission on the issue of the European Council’s decision to support a clearly violence prevention 
programme in West Africa in 2005 and was going on till 2008 after the ECJ ruled that conflict prevention 
can be funded within the development cooperation programmes coincided with the revision of the 
previous funding instruments to inter alia define a niche for funding peacebuilding and affected the final 
instruments for 2007-2013 period: explicit mentions of peacebuilding or conflict prevention were omitted.  
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Analysis of the prospects for a political shift from armed conflict to genuine conflict 
transformation demonstrated that it is not solely the state leadership who can move in 
either direction at its own will, but a combination of factors, such as preference of the 
state leadership regarding the conflict, ratio of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ constituencies within 
the society and sensitivity of the state leadership to public opinion (Mor 1997). A 
dovish leadership of the state where there are elections and other democratic procedures 
in place, and where the majority of the population opts for the armed path in the 
conflict, can do little to bring a negotiated solution closer. A hawkish leadership in this 
case gets a carte blanche. Civil society’s role in peacebuilding is aimed at the expansion 
of the “peace constituency” both in quantity and in their influence on the society and the 
leadership and at the greater sensitivity of the leadership to the opinion of society.  It is 
the civil society that struggles to close the gaps between the society and the leadership 
and influence them both. In other words, the struggle is to make society more 
democratic, with open communication channels and devolved decision-making (Fig. 1) 
 
 
Figure 1. Peacebuilding pyramid. On the basis of Lederach 1997: 39.  
 
The democratic change within a conflict party is of critical importance, but not 
tantamount to peacebuilding. The interactive aspect of peacebuilding that implies the 
creation, sustenance and expansion of an interface between the societies in conflict is 
being overlooked in the democratization agenda. In the absence of this interface, when 
the civil societies do not have ties across the line of division, peacebuilding becomes 
watered down, both as concept and as praxis. Where there is no context from which new 
intellectual and emotional impetuses emanate, new experiences of interacting with the 









means of “embedding it into a more promising place” (Galtung 2000:4) is impossible, 
because any “more promising place” is quickly shrinking.  At the same time, the 
internal organization and political culture of the society in conflict determines the 
prospects for an internal social change necessary for the initiation, implementation and 
sustenance of peace. Hence at least two Lederach pyramids should be the graphic 




Figure 2. Peacebuilding: vertical and horizontal dimensions. On the basis of Lederach 
1997: 39.  
 
 
One of the gaps in peacebuilding is the interdependence gap that means that the vertical 
(across the levels of the peacebuilding pyramid) and horizontal (across the division lines 
between conflict parties) integration is insufficient (Lederach 2001). Peacebuilding 
initiatives tend to concentrate on the horizontal dimension of conflict transformation, 
while liberal peace approach taken by the EU aims at the vertical dimension within 
conflict sides. The combination of the two is necessary. A comprehensive approach to 
the support of peacebuilding by civil society has a potential to close this gap. In other 
words, a civil society that is influential and genuine (vertical dimension), on the one 
hand, and competent in the peacebuilding sector (horizontal dimension), on the other, 
should be the desired outcome of the EU civil society support programs in the conflict 
zones.  
Peacebuilding is a particular sphere of civil society operation. CSOs that position 
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marginalization: they need to preserve trust and respect of their societies and retain 
influence on their authorities, on the one hand, and promote conflict transformation that 
implies a degree of deviation from the dominant national discourse on the goal and the 
means, and critical re-assessment of the own side’s wrongdoings and of the legitimacy 
of the grievances of the opponent side, on the other.  Peacebuilding requires of the civil 
society a nuanced and contingent set of strategies vis-à-vis their own society and 
leadership because the goal is not only to get rid of the undesired, but construct, 
preferably in an inclusive manner, new relationships “that in their totalities form new 
patterns, processes and structures” (Lederach 1997:85). This means that in order to be 
effective in peacebuilding CSOs ought to put pressure on their governments and engage 
in consultations and cooperate with them, and lead the societies by example and attune 
to the societies needs, hopes and fears. Hence the ethos of protest and confrontation and 
the ethos of conciliation and cooperation vis-à-vis own authorities and society are 
blended into the peacebuilding strategies of the civil society. This approach is along the 
lines of the integrated peacebuilding framework  and it would put the disassembled 
pyramid of peacebuilding where the rupture is either between the top- and mid-level 
(Gramscian critique of the EU support for civil society) or between the mid-and 
grassroots level of actors (leftist critique) (Tocci, 2008) back together again.  
 
The current EU support for civil society in the conflict settings in the Neighbourhood is 
not specific to the enhancement of their peacebuilding impact. With the exception of the 
Israeli and Palestinian CSOs that are direct recipients of the financial and political 
support for cross-conflict initiatives along with their international partners
7, the lion’s 
share of EU support for domestic civil society in the other conflict regions in the 
Neighbourhood goes to the CSOs that work within their own societies insulated from 
the opponent’s side, on issues that have precarious or no relevance for conflict 
transformation. At times a small portion of funds may be allocated for the cross-conflict 
initiatives, but they are short-term and small-scale, which  hampers the creation of the 
meaningful essence of an interface. Parallel activities with no cross-conflict component, 
casual and purely professional contacts or regional programs where only participants 
from the recognized states participate are important, but not strategic and usually 
become an imitation of peacebuilding as they do not lead to any social change on the 
ground. 
                                                 
7 Israeli and Palestinian civil societies benefit from the European Union Partnership for Peace (PfP) 




International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) benefit from the EU funding for 
bi-lateral (cross-conflict) and multi-lateral and regional initiatives in the Neighbourhood 
conflict zones from the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and since 2006 from the 
Instrument for Stability (IfS), but not from the ENPI. The role of the international CSOs 
is very important for the implementation of cross-conflict projects, because they act as 
conveners and mediators where direct cross-conflict activities are impossible to carry 
out. However, some local CSOs on the opposite sides of the divide do also initiate and 
implement cross-conflict projects without a third party, even though very few of these 
initiatives get funded by the EU
8.  
 
Figure 3 displays the Lederach pyramid model of peacebuilding that reflects the EU 
support for civil society and for conflict resolution. The EU plays a role in the Track I 
conflict resolution efforts in some of the conflicts in the Neighborhood
9. Support for 
civil society in the unrecognized aspiring states or autonomies and for civil society 
operating in the recognized states or the states-to-be-recognized by the international 
community is depicted with the punctuated and solid arrows, respectively, in order to 
illustrate the imbalance of assistance. 
 
                                                 
8 The examples are Internews-Armenia and Internews-Azerbaijan, Society for Humanitarian Research 
(Azerbaijan), Independent Television Center (Moldova), Combatants for Peace (Israel and Palestine), 
Caucasus Business and Development Network. Local chapters of international organizations, such as the 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and Helsinki Citizens Assembly engage in cross-conflict 
projects and even physically cross the lines of division. 
9 EU is a Middle East Quartet member, participates in the 5+2 Transnistria-Moldova negotiations as an 
observer, has EU Special Representatives (EUSR) in the South Caucasus, Georgia and Moldova and 




Figure 3. Peacebuilding: EU and European CSOs. On the basis of Lederach 1997: 39
10.  
 
Two predicaments hamper the EU cooperation with local and European CSOs in the 
area of peacebuilding. The first is vagueness and lack of soundness of the framework 
that links support for civil society with the impact on peacebuilding, which was 
discussed at length earlier. The second is the lack of recognition on behalf of the 
European institutions of the specialized competence in peacebuilding of a cluster of 
civil society organizations, just like the spheres of competence of other CSOs that 
specialize in the humanitarian assistance, education, human rights protection or election 
monitoring. This leads to the situation  when “programmes are initiated and resources 
allocated for many specific sectoral reasons, but with little thought as to how such 
choices might be oriented to preventing violent conflicts or buttressing the peaceful 
                                                 
10 For the purpose of simplicity of presentation the EU institutions are not deconstructed further into the 
different conflict resolution competencies of the European Commission, European Council and the 
European Parliament. For the detailed description of the division of roles  see (Kamov 2006).  
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capacities of these societies to navigate the perils of wrenching change” (Lund 
2003:164). 
  
The EU financing of peacebuilding civil society projects in the conflict areas is episodic 
and non-strategic. This may be attributed to the line of argument that civil society does 
not have political leverage hence cannot influence decision making at the national and 
international levels where presumably solutions are being coined and the ultimate 
bargaining, often invisible for the constituencies at home, takes place. Hence the 
investment into the civil society peacebuilding is unlikely to pay off. “The central 
impetus for peacebuilding comes from political actors, and above all, from the conflict 
parties themselves. These actors are often reinforced by strong regional actors such as 
the European Union in Europe and the Mediterranean, or India in South Asia” 
(Paffenholz 2009:6). This approach foremost responds to the question on who gets the 
‘conflict monopoly’ (Galtung 2000), rather than elucidates the issue of measuring the 
peacebuilding impact of those who do not get ‘the monopoly’. Civil society actors in 
peacebuilding are regarded as supplementary and largely apolitical. Besides, this 
approach extracts civil society from the conflict as if it is not a part and parcel of the 
‘conflict parties themselves’.  
 
The diagnosis of the lack of political impact of the civil society peacebuilding projects 
may be due to the inadequate impact assessment framework. I argue that if an impact of 
civil society peacebuilding is being sought at the level of social and political change, if 
‘positive peace’ is to be achieved through structural and cultural transformation, it 
cannot be assessed at the level of activities alone. Emphasis on activities or roles that 
are depositories of routine activities
11 diverts attention from the more fundamental and 
defining aspects of peacebuilding and creates a situation when “the ultimate goal of a 
just, sustainable peace is more often assumed to be linked to the project activities rather 
than directly factored into the project choices and strategies” (Anderson 2004). 
Peacebuilding is not merely a menu of strategies and activities from which to choose, 
because it has its ethics and theories. Activities by the peacebuilding cluster of civil 
society ought to be assessed in light of their theories of change that comprise a set of 
changes at various levels within and around the societies and polities in conflict that are 
                                                 
11 Functionalist approach that is based on the roles of civil society in conflict transformation is an 
example (Paffenholz, 2009)  
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believed to be needed to resolve the conflict and strategies to achieve the necessary 
change (Shapiro 2006; Church and Shouldice 2003).  
 
The present paper addresses peacebuilding impact assessment at the level of theories of 
change, which explicitly or implicitly inform policies, strategies and activities that fall 
into the category of conflict transformation. Theories of change in use by the EU were 
reconstructed from the main documents that concern conflicts and peacebuilding in the 
European Neighbourhood. Theories of change in use by civil society actors were 
elicited from the reflections and experiences of CSOs, both internal and external that 
operate in the conflict settings in the European Neighbourhood. The elicited theories of 
change in use by CSOs and the EU are juxtaposed and analysed against the backdrop of 
the specific class of state formation conflicts, on the one hand, and institutional capacity 
of the CSOs as change agents, on the other.  
 
The current disconnect between the peacebuilding EU-style and the peacebuilding by 
civil society, both internal and external to the respected conflicts, is reflected upon in 
the present paper in light of the two major conceptual rifts: 1) change versus stability in 
the concept of peace and praxis of peacebuilding and 2) principal versus satellite role 
allocation for the civil society in peacebuilding.  The proposed framework builds on the 
peace as change versus peace as stability approach and on the notion of civil society as 
an institutional basis for peacebuilding.  
 
The present paper lays the groundwork for a custom made framework for the forecast 
and assessment of the impact of CSOs onto peacebuilding in the case of state formation 
conflicts. The proposed framework can be employed by the EU institutions for building 
strategic partnerships with international and local civil society to enhance conflict 
transformation in the European Neighbourhood. 
 
2. Conflict resolution aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
Analysis of the Action Plans and other ENP documents is revealing of how the EU 
strategizes its “soft power” conflict transformation at the level of state elites. Since the 
Action Plans are negotiated and agreed upon with the respected state leaderships, the 
extent to which the latter are willing to yield to the EU’s appeal to peacefully resolve 
their conflicts and link progress in the conflict resolution with prospects for a more 
beneficial status vis-à-vis the EU can be judged on the basis of the respective texts.  
14 
 
Factors such as the limits of the state leaderships’ openness to actively search for 
mutually acceptable solutions, the EU willingness to invest in the search and in the post-
agreement rebuilding of the relationships and not least the preferred solution for the EU, 
set the context in which the EU’s actual and potential support for the peacebuilding civil 
society in the Neighbourhood can be assessed,  
 
ENP Action Plans and EU conflict interventions: review 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
The Action Plans for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories have the most 
elaborate description of specific steps that the two sides need to take in order to move 
towards the resolution of the conflict and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. A 
high degree of clarity and detail could be attributed to the strategic commitment of the 
EU to the comprehensive peace in the Middle East and to the particular solution to be 
pursued. The final political-territorial formula, a two-state solution, is prescribed in both 
plans. Overall, the EU direct political involvement and versatile and generous support to 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at all levels is extraordinary compared to the other 
conflicts in the Neighbourhood. EU is a Quartet member. It has also re-deployed the EU 
Police Mission in the occupied Palestinian Territory (EUPOL COPPS) in June 2007 in 
the West Bank (Gaza was not reachable). European Union Border Assistance Mission at 
Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) operated at the crossing point between Gaza and Egypt in the 
first half of 2007.  
 
Conflict resolution and violence prevention in the region is stated as one of the key 
goals of the Israel Action Plan. Israel is being called to help the emerging Palestinian 
state in its democratic reforms, support Palestinian authorities in their anti-terrorist 
policies and activities, and facilitate reconstruction and rehabilitation in Palestine. With 
regard to Israel’s internal state of democracy the EU has put an emphasis on the 
situation of the Arab and Bedouin minority concerning land and housing rights, 
employment and equality as a drawback that needs a permanent solution
12. The EU 
funds Israeli civil society organizations that deal with human rights violations in the 
OPT and minority issues within Israel, notably Arab minority issues. The issues of free 
movement between the West Bank and Gaza and Israel and settlement expansion are the 
object of criticism on behalf of the EU. The EU cooperates with Israel on combating 
                                                 
12
Commission (2009a)   
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anti-Semitism and in the field of combating terrorism, but criticizes it for violating its 
obligations in the sphere of human rights. 
 
The EU and its member states are the biggest donors of the infrastructural projects and 
development in Palestine. The EU strongly supports statebuilding in Palestine as the 
cornerstone for peace in the Middle East.: “Only an independent, democratic and viable 
Palestinian state can be a reliable neighbour for Israel”
13. 
 
The EU is a major donor for joint Israeli-Palestinian projects and initiatives. Palestinian 
and Israeli civil society organizations benefit from the Partnership for Peace within the 
Euro-Mediterranean framework.  The EU funds public sector institution building, i.e. 
state building and civil society building in Palestine. This is not to say that the 
relationships between the Palestinian authorities and civil society meet the standards of 
developed democracies. Neither is support for institution building symmetric between 
the West Bank and Gaza. Some commentators say that allocation of a substantially 
greater financial support as a means to reactivate institution building in Palestine went 
mostly to the West Bank, which furthered the split between the two Palestinian unities. 
 
The high level of the EU activity and decisiveness with regard to the peace process and 
the eventual solution can be explained so that “the EU perceives its future role as an 
institution builder in a Palestinian State as of prime importance and does not desire to 
lose this foothold, however precarious it may seem at present, especially as they are able 
to counterbalance the American influence amongst the Palestinians, something which 
will not happen with respect to Israel” (Newman and Yacobi 2004: 32). The Action 
Plans for Israel and the Palestinian Authority touch upon political and practical 
measures on the transformation of the conflict issue (a permanent two-state solution) 
and on the elimination of structural, cultural and direct violence
14.  
 
Furthermore, the EU has signed Action Plans with all the major protagonists of the 
Middle East peace process. However even this relatively elaborate framework is being 
                                                 
13 Statebuilding for Peace in the Middle East: An EU Action Strategy: New Momentum in the Peace 
Process , 23/11/2007, http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/specialftr.asp?id=58  
14EU-Israel Action Plan,  http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/israel_enp_ap_final_en.pdf; EU-
Palestinian Authority Action Plan, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/pa_enp_ap_final_en.pdf   
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criticized by the Arab states as lacking conflict resolution power because it does not 
offer an instrument and is lacking authority to resolve the key issues of greatest 




The EU position on the conflict in Western Sahara is somewhat ambiguous. The first 
reason for the ambiguity is that the 1975 UN Resolution on the referendum on self-
determination of Western Sahara has not been implemented and is unlikely to be 
implemented in the foreseeable future. The situation persists where the two primary 
sides of the conflict, namely Morocco and the Polisario Front representing the self-
determination movement of Sahrawis are not able to agree on who will vote in the 
referendum and what voting choices will be presented. The argument concerns the 
Moroccans who settled in Western Sahara since Morocco had established control over 
the territory and the Sahrawi refuges who reside in the camps in Algeria. In other words, 
a solution path had been paved two decades ago, while neither the conflict parties nor 
the international community managed to put it into action.  
 
Secondly, this conflict has been defined by the UN within the decolonization 
framework. The fact that the conflict remains unresolved creates a moral burden for ‘old 
Europe’ that has long parted with its colonial past. Spain is a particularly ardent 
advocate of the self-determination of Western Sahara, its former colony. There are also 
several international non-governmental advocacy networks that promote the Western 
Sahara independence cause. At the same time, the moral imperative of decolonization is 
not matched with the Realpolitik imperative to encourage political warming within 
Morocco, closely related to the closer association and stronger alliance between the EU 
and the Kingdom.  
 
Thirdly, the EU finds itself in a difficult position with regard to its commitment to 
safeguard human rights and the need to partner with the Moroccan state in the areas of 
primary security concerns for the EU, such as migration, terrorism and energy supply. 
Besides, Morocco is an important trade partner for the EU
15.  This conflict has been one 
                                                 
15 Polisario Front and European pro-Sahrawi organizations are vocal about the controversial reaction to 
the 2005 EU agreement with Morocco on fisheries in the waters of Western Sahara, of which Sahrawis 
get little or no share.  
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of the watched cases of severe violations of human rights of Sahrawis in Western 
Sahara by the Moroccan state. The official European institutions are criticized by vocal 
human rights groups and pro-Sahrawi advocates in Europe for the inadmissible 
appeasement of the Moroccan state that compromises the EU human rights protection 
agenda. The European Parliament (EP) has exercised its right to freeze financial 
protocols in the case of severe human rights violations in 1992 on the grounds of human 
rights abuse in Western Sahara. The delegation of the EP visited Western Sahara to 
monitor the situation of human rights in 2002 and in January 2009 and visited the 
refugee camps in Tindouf in 2006
16. The EP issued several resolutions that criticized the 
Moroccan authorities for their violations of basic human rights of Sahrawis, expressed 
willingness to encourage a search for a fair and durable solution and affirmed its support 
to the UN efforts in this direction. It is noteworthy that the conflict resolution is 
regarded as a decolonization process in view of the legal yardstick of self-determination 
of Western Sahara
17. At the same time, the first Governance Facility allocations were 
made to Morocco in 2007 as additional support to the partner country that has made 
most progress in implementing the governance priorities agreed in their Action Plans. 
Observers also note that in recent years the issue of Western Sahara emerged from the 
oblivion in the non-state Moroccan media, which is significant progress in itself. Fourth, 
the fact that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was recognized by 49 
states creates a difficult dilemma for the EU that generally does not recognize and 
engage in bi-lateral relations with de facto authorities in the breakaway entities seeking 
statehood, but cannot ignore the substantial recognition rate of Western Sahara
18. 
The EU presence in the conflict region is of a humanitarian nature. The European 
Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provides humanitarian assistance to the 
Sahrawi refugees in the camps in Algeria along with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP), the Spanish 
Agency for International Cooperation for Development and Spanish, Italian and Irish 
civil society organizations and individuals and families from Spain.  
 
There is no mention of the conflict over Western Sahara in the Morocco Action Plan. 
However in the Country Strategy Paper it is stated that the resolution of the conflict 
over Western Sahara is of key importance for regional stability and development. The 
                                                 
16 UN Security Council (2009)  
17European Parliament (2009); European Parliament (2005)  
18 The EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner met with the leader of the 
Polisario Front for the first time in 2009.  
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UN plan for the settlement is referred to, but no specific measures are proposed to 
Morocco to break the stalemate. The Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for Algeria mentions that Algeria has a border dispute with Morocco over 
Western Sahara, and this conflict has blocked Maghreb Arab Union. In sum, the conflict 
is regarded as an impediment to the effective functioning of the regional networks such 
as the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union, of which Morocco is not a member, 
while the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is.  
 
Negotiations on the main subject stagnate. Second-order issues such as the question of 
ground transportation for family visits between the Sahrawis in the Territory and in the 
refugee camps that need a tri-lateral, Polisario-Algeria-Morocco consent have a better 
chance to succeed. Confidence building does not expand beyond the two categories of 
the Sahrawis, those in the camps and those in the Territory. There are virtually no cross-
conflict initiatives where Moroccans and Sahrawis participate together
19. On the other 
side of the divide, the Polisario Front has a record of human rights violations and 
curtailment of freedoms within the refugee camps in Algeria. Those who question the 
leadership’s line in the conflict are ousted. Hence the lack political party competition or 
non-aligned civil society groups there
20. Large Sahrawi CSOs are civil branches of the 
ruling party.  
 
Azerbaijan/Nagorny Karabakh/Armenia conflict 
The EU has Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan, but not with Nagorny 
Karabakh. The two Action Plans have different wordings that say much about the two 
parties’ approach to the conflict. In the Action Plan for Azerbaijan
21 there is a clause 
related to the resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict about the intensification of 
the EU dialogue with the states concerned, while the analogous clause in the Armenia 
Action Plan
22 is formulated as a dialogue with the parties concerned. This reflects 
                                                 
19 A EU-funded project by the Talk Together, a British CSO that was supposed to bring together youth 
from Morocco proper, from Western Sahara and from the camps in Algeria for a dialogue and joint 
educational and recreational activities was put on hold, because all the expected participants were stopped 
at their airports of departure. Western Sahrawi participants reported they were detained, tortured and 
intimidated
19. This is not the first time that Sahrawis and Moroccans are prevented by the Moroccan 
government from travel to events in Europe
19. Likewise travel of Moroccans and Sahrawis within 
Morocco is under surveillance, although no formal restrictions apply in most cases. 
20 Human Rights Watch (2008)  
21 EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan. Available 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf  
22 EU /Armenia Action Plan. Available 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf   
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reluctance of Azerbaijan to engage with Nagorny Karabakh as an independent conflict 
party and Armenia’s insistence on its involvement in the official peace process as such. 
The EU states support of the OSCE Minsk group efforts, but the foundations of this 
support are described differently in the two Action Plans. The Armenia Action Plan 
mentions the principle of self-determination of peoples as one of the international norms 
and principles as the basis for a search for a solution . In the Azerbaijan Action Plan the 
basis for the resolution is the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE 
documents that endorse territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and does not refer to the 
principle of the right for self-determination. It is important to note that in the Azerbaijan 
Action Plan peaceful resolution of Nagorny Karabakh conflict is priority number one, 
while in the Armenia Action Plan it is priority number seven, which reflects a clear 
asymmetry in the degree of urgency to resolve the conflict as felt by the two parties.  
 
In the Country Strategy Paper for Armenia it is merely mentioned that peaceful 
resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict is a priority for the Armenian government 
despite the current difficulties in the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan
23. In the 
Country Strategy Paper for Azerbaijan, cooperation with the EU on the peaceful 
settlement of Nagorny Karabakh conflict is described in detail. EU would support a 
post-settlement consolidation of peace financially and otherwise through the assistance 
to the return of the Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees to the former conflict areas, their 




In the area of civil society involvement in peacebuilding, regional youth peace summer 
camps were mentioned as the progress made in the direction towards a more secure and 
peaceful South Caucasus. Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly was given credit in the Country 




Both documents have identical wording in the description of the progress in the top-
level meetings that has been achieved in the meetings at the end of the 2008 when first 
                                                 
23 Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_armenia_en.pdf  
24 Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013. Available  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_azerbaijan_en.pdf  




joint declarations were signed since 1994. However, there is no mention of the 
Azerbaijan position vis-à-vis the Turkish Caucasian platform for stability and 
cooperation initiative and warming of the Armenian-Turkish relations, while in the 
Armenia country report it is stated that Armenia endorsed the initiative. This difference 
is indicative of the two countries’ aspirations and fears in terms of the regional dynamic 
around the Nagorny Karabakh conflict: Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is being 
perceived as a threat in Azerbaijan and the mention of this in the Country Progress 
Report would have been too contradictory and sensitive.  
 
Georgia/Abkhazia conflict 
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is defined in the Action Plan for Georgia as a conflict in 
Abkhazia, Georgia, and the solution is prescribed to be sought within the internationally 
recognized borders of Georgia. The EU also expresses willingness to take responsibility 
to include the issue of territorial integrity of Georgia and the conflict settlement into the 
agenda of the EU-Russia political dialogue meetings
26. Stagnation in the quest for the 
resolution of the conflicts is attributed to the unfortunate international and regional 
context that undermines Georgia’s peace plan.   
 
Georgian government has been objecting any international assistance to Abkhazia, 
including civil society development. After the August 2008 war the Deputy Minister of 
Reintegration disseminated a memorandum among foreign donors that strictly 
prohibited any interaction with the regime in Abkhazia. Despite this the EU and other 
donors have been present in Abkhazia. The framework that was acceptable for the 
Georgian government was one of assistance to people affected by conflict. The 
geography of external aid was defined as the “inside” of the conflict area and the 
adjacent region
27, or the conflict zone that included Abkhazia, particularly the Gal(-i) 
district, and Western Georgia.  
 
Since the late 1990s the EU was supporting projects aimed at the rehabilitation of the 
livelihoods and infrastructure in the districts on both sides of the Ingur(-i) river. The 
first EU funding of the civil society and infrastructure rehabilitation projects in 
                                                 
26 EU/Georgia Action Plan. Available 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf; Georgia Country Strategy 
Paper, 2007-2013. Available http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf  
27 http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/programmes/rehabilitation1.html   
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Abkhazia came in 2005
28. The European Commission (EC) has been clearly distancing 
itself from the political side of conflict resolution. Instead its funding was channeled 
intosupport for livelihoods of the conflict-affected areas, economic rehabilitation and 
general democratization and human rights protection in the two societies as confidence 
building measures.  
 
The implementation of the rehabilitation projects was the responsibility of UNOMIG 
and UNDP in Abkhazia. The EC supported IDP rehabilitation projects in Georgia 
proper. Within the Decentralized Cooperation programme and EIDHR frameworks the 
EU has been supporting civil society in Abkhazia, including support for human rights 
NGOs, dialogue with local authorities, development of free media and improvement of 
the judiciary. 
 
The number of funded Georgian NGOs as implementers of the socio-rehabilitation 
projects is visibly greater compared to the Abkhaz ones. In fact, almost all the 
rehabilitation funding went to the UNDP, UNOMIG and EBRD and not to any local 
Abkhaz NGO. This could be partly explained by the sensitivity of the issue of an 
Abkhaz NGO doing rehabilitation work in the Gali district and partly to the lack of the 
domestic expertise. Besides, the de facto status was a challenge for the direct EU-
Abkhaz CSO funding. Same is true for the democratization  projects in Abkhazia. The 
recipients of most of the funding were the Danish Refugee Council, World Vision and 
ICRC.  
 
The majority of the EU-funded projects are for rehabilitation, relief and development. 
They are of crucial importance in their own right, but have a very thin if any conflict 
transformation component and do not involve both sides of the conflict. More 
specifically, the funded rehabilitation, democratization and human rights projects were 
taking place either in Abkhazia or in Georgia proper and there were no joint cross-
conflict projects. The exception is the Inguri Hydropower Plant reconstruction and 
rehabilitation project that is the most vivid albeit the sole example of the cooperation 
between the two sides that has never been interrupted. Explicitly cross-conflict projects 
were run by the international peacebuilding NGOs, Conciliation Resources, 
International Alert and Berghof Center that received funding under the RRM and later 
IfS.  
                                                 




Apart from the ENP the EU has other conflict resolution modalities vis-à-vis the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the crisis in 
Georgia was appointed shortly after the August 2008 war and shortly after the EU 
Monitoring Mission was deployed. The EU, represented by the EUSR, EC and 
diplomats from the member states, co-facilitates the post-war Geneva talks between 
Russia and Georgia where Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also represented. Besides, 
there is the office of the EUSR for the South Caucasus that deals with all three conflicts 
in the region. The constructive dialogue of the EUSR and international peacebuilding 
CSOs with the Ministry of Reintegration
29 has facilitated the adoption by the Ministry 
of the strategy for engagement without recognition. The public and political discussion 
has just started and it is not clear yet whether the strategy will be endorsed. However 
this was a substantial step forward. The most notable trait of this new development is 
that the internal civil society dialogue with the Georgian government, primarily the 
Ministry of the Reintegration, has clearly created an impetus for change. This is an 
example of synergy between the EU, European peacebuilding civil society and 
Georgian civil society in the search for new avenues for the revival of the peace process. 
 
Moldova/Transnistria 
The EU has turned its attention to the Moldova-Transnistria conflict after the big 
accession bang in 2004. In light of Moldova’s EU aspirations that are less fanciful than 
in other cases, largely due to its geographic position, this conflict has been attracting 
increasing interest after the accession of Romania, a stakeholder in the conflict. The 
EUSR to Moldova was appointed in 2005 with a clearly stated task to strengthen EU 
contribution to the resolution of the conflict. Besides, the EUBAM that was set up in 
response to the joint Moldovan-Ukrainian request to assist with the customs procedures 
at the border between Ukraine and Transnistria began its operation in 2005. Notably, 
both sides of the conflict (Moldova and Transnistria), the Ukraine and the EU came to 
cooperate with each other. The EU also has consultative status within the 5+2 
negotiations format.  
In the Country Strategy Paper the resolution of the Transnistria conflict is said to be the 
priority for the Moldovan government. The ‘to do’ list is elaborate and specific
30, which 
                                                 
29 The EC is co-funding the Georgian State Ministry of Reintegration. 




is an indication of the serious intentions of the EU with regard to the steady progression 
towards the resolution of this conflict. However the EU is still in search of its proper 
role in the Moldova-Transnistria peace process. This is clear from its cautious support 
for civil society on the two banks. No specialized peacebuilding cross-conflict projects 
have been supported by the EU so far
31. Parallel projects in the area of ecology, health 
and rehabilitation of disabled children with a manifestly apolitical agenda receive 
funding from the EU Delegation in Moldova through UNDP. It is important to note that 
unlike in other conflict regions in the Eastern Neighbourhood where people do not have 
access to the opposite side of the conflict, in the Moldova-Transnistria case civil society 
representatives can participate in meetings and events on the other side. Although 
selective restrictions, intimidation and travel bans take place, more often by the 
Transnistrian authorities, but the softness of the separation line is a major asset with 
regard to conflict resolution. Besides, the EU does not seem to have strict limitations on 
the engagement and funding of Transnistrian CSOs. More often this assistance is being 
channeled through Moldovan CSOs, which is reluctantly and selectively accepted by 
Transnistrian authorities. This facilitates cross-divide activities, although Transnistrian 
authorities are very cautious with regard to whom to let in. Recently the EUSR for 
Moldova was declared persona non grata in Transnistria. However his Chisinau staff 
continue their communication and visits across the divide. There are plans to intensify 
the cross-conflict rapprochement by expanding EU funding for the development of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Transnistria,  
Assistance to civil society from the EU so far has not expanded beyond the social 
services sphere, capacity development for NGOs and creation of resource centers
32. 
Moldovan Think Tanks attempt to inform the negotiations agenda and propose a 
strategy for the transformation of the conflict, however some of the efforts in this 




                                                 
31 Global Conflict Prevention Pool (UK) has funded an IMPACT project directed by the PATRIR, which 
brought together researchers from the two banks of the river to compile a book that embodied joint 
analysis of the consequences of the stagnant peace process. 
32 http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/pdf/project_civil_society_en.pdf 
 
33 The 3”D” (Democratization, Demilitarization and Decriminalization of Transnistria) proposal by the 
Institute for Public Policy made it to the top political agenda, but was rejected by Transnistria and by the 
moderates within the Moldovan civil society. Their line of argument was that democratization of 




Deficiencies of the ENP Action Plans and EU conflict interventions 
The first deficiency of the Action Plans and their implementation is that not all conflict 
parties are recognized and treated as such
34 and only one is a partner and the target of 
the EU “soft policy”. This situation counters the declarative commitment to 
peacebuilding in the conflict areas in the Neighbourhood by means of “promoting 
similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines”
35. The chances that the strategy of 
bringing the states and one state-to-be in the European Neighbourhood closer to the 
European standards of politics and economy contributes to peace are random, since the 
major condition of holistic integrated peacebuilding is not observed. The condition for 
peace within this framework is  increased interdependence of the former opponent 
societies and polities (Lederach 1997). Bringing one conflict party closer to the 
standards of the EU widens the gap between the ‘favoured’ and ‘not favoured’ conflict 
parties rather than closes it, at least insofar as the ‘not favoured’ party’s prospects of 
making itself a separate unit within the EU interest orbit are negligible.  
Only in the case of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict both entities have the ENP Action 
Plan. Here the strategy is adequate to the conflict format, especially given that Jordan, 
Lebanon and Egypt, important actors in the conflict and in the Middle East Peace 
Process also have their ENP Acton Plans. In all other cases at least one of the primary 
conflict parties is not a signatory to any agreement with the EU.  The situation when the 
authorities in the non-recognized entities are neglected or directly stigmatized as illegal 
hence not eligible for the EU good governance, rule of law and democratization 
program support may and often does lead to the marginalization of the few CSOs that 
do get EU attention and funding within the society and persecution by the authorities on 
the premise of their sellout or conspiracy. These CSOs are vulnerable and do not have 
access to international protection mechanisms and institutions.  
 
Where the EU or other donors support the development of civil society organizations 
only on one side of the conflict, CSOs on the other, unattended side, find themselves in 
a much more difficult situation as change agents vis-à-vis their authorities compared to 
their recognized colleagues. This leads to the dominance of pro-authority organizations 
                                                 
34 For example, the EU presence in Abkhazia was acceptable for the Georgian government as an 
assistance to people affected by conflict in the conflict zone that includes Abkhazia, predominantly Gal(-
i) district and Western Georgia that are referred to as the “inside” of the conflict area and the adjacent 
region. Explicitly cross-conflict projects were run by the international peacebuilding NGOs, Conciliation 
Resources, International Alert and Berghof Center that received funding under the RRM and later IfS 
(http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/programmes/rehabilitation1.html). 
35 Commission (2007)   
25 
 
that are unlikely to raise alternative opinions or challenge the political authority
36, 
which is a necessary condition for the rapprochement between the opposing sides. 
Besides, solidarity between civil societies on the opposite sides of the conflict is 
hampered, which impairs resolution of the second-order cross-cutting issues that 
enhance overall human security in the conflict context. 
 
The second deficiency is the lack of conceptual clarity and of financial and political 
commitment on behalf of the EU, which is an obstacle for raising its profile as a 
peacebuilding agent. This  transpires in the generic wording of the conflict resolution 
related paragraphs in the Action Plans or even omission of the mentions of the conflict 
and inconsistency in the references to the international legal standards for the resolution 
of state formation conflicts across the Action Plans
37. The overall tendency to delegate 
the peacebuilding responsibility to other actors, such as the UN and OSCE is also an 
indicator of the EU’s diffidence vis-à-vis protracted conflicts. Action Plans for Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territory is a notable exception. The EU has also recently 
intensified its participation in the Transnistria conflict resolution after over a decade of 
virtual neglect of the conflict.  
 
The third deficiency is that the differentiation in the policies of the EU towards different 
states seems to derive from the variations in the relationships between the EU and the 
particular state leaderships in the Neighbourhood, which are shaped not least by EU 
self-interest, rather than from the rigorous conflict analysis on the ground. The success 
or failure of a “soft power” approach is determined not only by the persuasiveness of 
the attractive alternative to the status quo, but also by the legitimacy of the actor that 
takes this approach. The latter is particularly important in the context of protracted 
conflicts in the European Neighbourhood where the Idealpolitik foundation of the EU 
interventions is shaken by the EU oscillating between the role of an honest broker, an 
idealist human rights advocate, a bystander and a classic realist driven by the Realpolitik 
of a trade and energy, counter-terrorism agenda,  the opportunity to raise the EU profile 
                                                 
36 This is the case with the National Union of Women, National Union of Youth and National Union of 
Workers created by the Polisario  Front in the refugee camps in Algeria. The Polisario Front has a record 
of human rights violations and curtailment of diversity of views on the core and linked conflict issues 
(Human Rights Watch 2008). 
37 A clear preference for the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is expressed in the two 
respective Action Plans, a reference to the principle of self-determination of people is made in Armenia 
Action plan, but not in the Azerbaijan Action plan, while in the Action plans for Moldova and Georgia 
the principle of territorial integrity is stated as the basis for the resolution of the Transnistria and 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, respectively.   
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vis-à-vis the USA as a peace broker or state builder, such as in the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (Newman and Yacobi 2004: 32) and power contests. Besides, an  
EU that appears to be more demanding and commanding towards some partners but not 
others may reduce its credibility further (Smith 2005). 
 
At the same time the ENP and other documents of relevance for peacebuilding in the 
Neighborhood do have components that have a more robust link with the enhancement 
of peacebuilding and eventual resolution of the conflicts compared to the generic 
promotion of domestic democratic reforms as a way to peace. They concern alternative 
formats for the interaction of the representatives of the rival parties and 
institutionalization of the cross-conflict cooperation, which may soften the issue of 
disputed borders. However these proposals require a sound theory of change at the 
foundation with regard to their effect on peacebuilding prospects and ought to stem 
from an actual analysis of reality rather than wishful thinking. Otherwise they may 
remain on paper like the South Caucasus Parliament or bring actors from the opposing 
sides together in specialized settings or for a specific non-conflict related task
38, but not 
alter relationships between conflict parties or create new frameworks for conflict 
transformation.  This happens either because one of the parties does not participate
39 in 
an initiative or because regional formats are imposed from the outside on the 
stakeholders who have little or no incentive to go regional, or yet because the 
encounters and joint activities between the sides are designed and/or facilitated with a 
clear conflict transformation strategy in mind. 
 
The vagueness of the EU framework of operation vis-à-vis external conflicts matches 
the generality of conflict analysis by the European institutions in question: the check-list 
of root causes of conflicts includes poverty, inequality, oppression, poor governance 
and human rights violations that are the lowest common denominator of causes and 
aggravating factors pertinent to various types of conflicts ranging from civil wars to 
                                                 
38 Both Armenian and Azerbaijani participation in the Regional Environmental Centre for the Caucasus 
and in a programme on integrated border management in the Southern Caucasus is praised in the 
respective Country Progress Reports (Commission 2009c; Commission 2009d) 
39 Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh do not participate in the EU-supported regional 
initiatives in the South Caucasus. A notable exception with regard to the involvement of the unrecognized 
entities into regional initiatives was the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) that was set up in 
response to the joint Moldovan-Ukrainian request to assist with the customs procedures at the border 
between Ukraine and Transnistria. It started its  operation in 2005. Both, Moldova and Transnistria, as 
well as Ukraine and the EU were cooperating with each other on the border management issues 
(Commission 2009e)  
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resource wars and to class and nationalist conflicts
40. Although useful as a list of 
indicators for an initial brief early warning analysis across a big number of cases, this 
list falls short of providing a solid conflict analysis basis for crafting strategies for either 
the EU intervention into a particular conflict situation or for mandating and funding 
other interveners. The proposed checklist is composed in a static mode and depicts a 
snapshot of the conflict. Although regular revision of the situation with this checklist is 
prescribed, a set of successive snapshots does not suffice for the analysis of the conflict 
as a dynamic system and the key question on why the situation has or has not changed 
remains unanswered.  
 
The still-prevalent conflict analysis mode where there are conflict causes and symptoms 
defined in a static way and spread apart on a temporal dimension is helpful as the initial 
mapping of the new and complex conflict situations, but may be misleading in the 
design of conflict interventions. After decades of separation and no common institutions 
the two (or more) peoples’ relationships, some of the core conflict issues, the attitudes 
towards war as a means to resolve conflict, peacebuilding capacity and other 
characteristics of the conflict system are very different from the initial constellation of 
the above characteristics. The objective to eradicate root structural causes needs to be 
tempered. The structures and culture that had given rise to the violent conflict in the first 
place most likely are not in place anymore. Instead new structures and culture have 
emerged where the symptoms may have become the causes in their own right and 
‘cultural’ violence in terms of popular attitudes may have turned ‘structural’ had the 
legislation been passed to anchor the evolved ‘culture’. Besides, the conflict parties get 
mired in the action-counter-action routine that may create a new conflict reality that 
supersedes the original constellation of the conflict and creates new causes of more 
immediate concern for the parties. In a complex conflict system that has undergone 
significant changes throughout the course of the conflict a more promising place to 
initiate conflict transformation may be emphasising solutions rather than problems and 
acknowledging multiple peaceful futures (Ropers 2008).  
 
Emergence of theories and praxis of participatory peacebuilding and multi-track 
diplomacy, expansion of the notion of violence (direct, cultural and structural), and 
introduction of justice and reconciliation variables into the peacebuilding equation 
                                                 
40 European Commission Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict, 2001, 
http://ec.europa/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm   
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shaped the contemporary peacebuilding discourse. These theories provide necessary 
depth and versatility compared to the liberal peace paradigm for building peace in the 
conflicts that unfold between the state and a non-state entity and between non-state 
entities, which constitute the majority of the protracted violent conflicts since the end of 
the Cold War. A systemic approach to conflicts has introduced another important 
dimension to peacebuilding, namely the “learning” capacity of a conflict system that 
means it is constantly changing due to external and internal perturbations and is always 
susceptible to change (Ropers 2008). All the progressive conflict resolution rhetoric can 
be found in the conceptual EU documents (Pérez 2004), but at the programmatic level 
and in the politics vis-à-vis protracted conflicts the classic development and security 
agendas do not seem to be enriched and amended with approaches and strategies that 
ensure conflict sensitivity at a minimum and preferably a specialized peacebuilding 
agenda.  
 
3. Theories of change in use by peacebuilding CSOs in the five state formation 
conflicts in the European Neighbourhood  
Theories of change allow for the evaluation of peacebuilding interventions (ex post facto), but 
as well for the forecast of the impact (ex ante). This section provides examples of theories of 
change that drive the peacebuilding operations of CSOs in the conflict areas in the European 
Neighbourhood. Some of them are specific to state formation conflicts, while others are more 
universal. This is neither an evaluation of the accuracy and relevance of the discovered 
theories for the respective conflict contexts (although most of them have a solid ground 
theory basis or have given rise to new ground theories) nor an evaluation of the performance 
of the CSOs. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate diversity and robustness of 
theories of change in peacebuilding that should be incorporated into the generic 
democracy-peace paradigm or regional and cross-cutting issues initiatives that form the 
theory of change in the EU approach to peacebuilding.  
 
3.1 Theories of change in use by the peacebuilding CSOs in the European 
Neighbourhood 
 
Introduction of new formats of interaction between the conflict sides broadens the 
space for the search for political-territorial solutions 
There are CSOs that work in the supra-state (regional), multi-lateral and cross-conflict 
bi-lateral sub-state (local-to-local) formats. Versatility of the formats of engagement of  
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conflict parties is important to tackle the asymmetry issue pertinent to state formation 
conflicts and diversity of conflict analyses and solution proposals amongst single 
conflict parties. This way non-recognized aspiring states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Transnistria) and states-to-be (Palestine) can participate in the broader regional projects 
on a par with the states, for example. Internal dialogue that provides avenues for the 
expression of the variety of views on the conflict, like the one that was initiated by the 
civil society in Georgia after the August 2008 war, is another example of a format that 
serves the purpose of breaking the monopoly of the authorities on building the strategy 
in the conflict. Caucasus Business and Development Network is an example of the 
3+3+1 format of economic entities that includes three states and three unrecognized 
republics in the South Caucasus and Turkey. This network turns the concept of an 
integrated South Caucasus economic space into reality through specific projects and 
brands (Caucasus Cheese, Caucasus Tea, Caucasus Wine) and advocacy for the 
legalization of economic activities across the conflict frontiers. It also supports 
economic projects at the local level, especially in the borderlands in order to accentuate 
that survival needs at the periphery may run counter to the rigid position of the center 
that cuts off traditional and most economically sound business routes and production 
chains. These projects also widen the accessible interface between the conflict sides. In 
the sphere of collective psychology this project serves the purpose of the creation and 
maintenance of supra-national identities as a promising mechanism for peaceful co-
existence between rival national projects that claim exclusive rights to define 
sovereignty of a particular ethno-territorial entity. Civil society and other non-state 
socially prominent actors thus acquire particular importance as producers and promoters 
of inclusive diverse identities, transnational, supra-state, sub-state and beyond the state 
identities. 
 
Mediator, a Transnistrian organization, promotes a format where borders are softened 
while each conflict party preserves its sovereignty. The format implies a mediating and 
a cross-roads position of Transnistria between Russia and the European Union. This 
position acquires particular importance with regard to the proposals for new security 
architecture at the interface of Europe and Russia. The format where the non-recognized 
Transnistria can establish relations with the EU is reflected upon in light of EU 
competence in the political and economic regional arrangements that allow for the 
expression and implementation of national identities and self-determination beyond the 




Modeling dialogue on the basis of mutual recognition and reciprocity restores the 
broader society’s trust in the possibility of a dialogue with the opponent side 
When people from the opposing sides cannot meet in person to hold a dialogue or a 
discussion within the borders of the conflict system due to the minimal or non-existent 
interface, media come to the rescue. Bitterlemons.org is an Internet platform for Israeli 
and Palestinian academics, politicians, civil society figures, and individual intellectuals 
and activists of all political affiliations and beliefs to juxtapose ideas, arguments and 
analyses. A pallet of views from both sides of the conflict thus appears on the site and 
equality in the expression of views is modeled. 
 
The Dialogue Through Film project that is run jointly by the London-based Conciliation 
Resources and Internews-Armenia, Internews-Azerbaijan and Stepanakert Press Club 
creates a special form of dialogue by means of watching and discussing short ‘human 
stories’ documentaries by young Azeris and Karabakhi Armenians as a method of 
exchanging their ideas and emotions with regard of the war and post-war life in their 
societies.  
 
Internews-Armenia and Internews-Azerbaijan implemented a model of the television-
mediated dialogue that was broadcast to the two national audiences. Twenty four 
weekly  Front Line dialogue series where government officials and oppositional 
politicians, civil society activists, 
intellectuals, former soccer star teammates, artists and other interlocutors debated the 
causes and the substance of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, shared memories of the 
common life space, and exchanged their hopes and nostalgias were watched by 50% of 
the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan, an overwhelming majority of whom 
regarded this as a sign of hope for the re-opening of the political dialogue. These data 
indirectly support the theory of change at the root of this peacebuilding initiative. 
 
Reconstruction of the communication space where there is isolation and lack of 
interface models a common public sphere that prepares the societies for co-
existence 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Armenia and Azerbaijan sponsors a daily 
newspaper insert with articles by Armenian and Azeri journalists about various aspects 
of the life of their societies. The Alternative Start initiative by intellectuals and activist  
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across the South Caucasus made the Internet discussion platform accessible for people 
in different parts of the South Caucasus to participate in, share their ideas, reflections 
and emotions, and call for solidarity. This initiative combats nationalism and isolation 
not merely with essays on politics, conflicts, human rights and other pressing issues that 
every registered partner can submit and comment on, but by means of public awareness, 
advocacy campaigns and assistance to the victims persecuted on political grounds. 
 
The Ethnoforum initiative by the Center for Independent Television was carried out as 
debates and dialogue between public officials, journalists and NGOs from the two banks 
of Nistru river broadcast life on the Moldovan Public Television that people on both 
sides can watch. Greatly appreciated by the audience, this program was acknowledged 
by the EU as a successful socially important undertaking.  
 
These two theories of change address the issue of the creation, sustenance and 
expansion of the interface between the parties that grow more and more parochial and 
entrenched in their positions, which is the case in all the state formation conflicts in the 
Neighborhood. 
 
Combating discrimination of the ‘enemy kin’ within own societies increases 
tolerance and adherence to the universal humanistic standards 
Mossawa Center promotes the equality of Palestinian citizens of Israel as well as of 
other minority clusters of the Israeli society believing that there is no peace without 
equality. Nagev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development promotes co-
existence between Arabs and Jews through the empowerment of the Arab Bedouin 
communities. Tolerance is being fostered by means of the creation of exemplar equality 
spaces such as mixed classrooms. 
 
The Society for Humanitarian Research, an Azerbaijani CSO safeguards human rights 
of Armenians in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani and Armenian activists from the Helsinki 
Citizens Assembly were jointly facilitated hostages and prisoners of war protection and 
exchange irrespective of their nationality. 
 
These peacebuilding strategies tackle the problem of the discrimination, injustice and 
human rights violations of the minority that found itself on the ‘wrong side’ of the state 




Those from conflict-affected communities whose immediate needs were attended in 
a peacebuilding project or program are likely to join ‘peace constituency’ 
Georgian branch of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly assists ethnic Georgian 
refugees/IDPs who have been evicted from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to have 
opportunities for political expression and civic organization for conflict victims, who 
are usually socially and politically marginalized or manipulated by militants in gaining 
equality within the Georgian society to participate in the peace process and benefit from 
a negotiated solution. This is believed to be a foundation for their constructive 
involvement in conflict transformation. 
Union of Women-Entrepreneurs in Abkhazia was established after the war when men 
were banned from crossing the Russian border, the only exit for trade, and women 
shouldered a burden of providing for the families. They assisted women with start-up 
loans and grants, business skills training and otherwise. This work made the 
organization trusted and respected. Later they started helping Georgian women in the 
border Gal(-i) region, the most disadvantaged and physically and socially unprotected 
community of the ‘enemy’ kin, start and run small enterprises. Their Abkhaz and 
Georgian clients later became a ‘peace constituency’ in the cross-conflict business 
initiatives of the Caucasus Business Development Network as they immediately 
experienced dividends of transparent and unrestricted economic relations with the 
neighbours across the conflict divide. 
 
Calling public attention to the wrongdoings and mistakes of own side disaggregates 
the conflict parties, reduces the sense of own righteousness and/or of exclusive 
victimhood and fosters critical thinking 
The Society for Humanitarian Research and Helsinki Citizens Assembly in Azerbaijan 
call the authorities to include Nagorny Karabakh as a partner in negotiations. They also 
confront nationalist and militant discourse in the political arena.  
 
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly in Nagorny Karabakh acknowledged their own army’s 
crime against Azerbaijani civilians and publicly apologized before Azerbaijani people.  
 
B'Telem, an Israeli-Palestinian NGO with headquarters in Israel sensitizes Israeli public 
to the suffering and human rights abuses of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza due 




Positioning oneself and acting as a ‘third side’ demonstrates that people have a 
choice in the nationalist conflict 
Leading by the example of acting as a ‘third side’ (Ury 2000) yet being ‘ascribed’ to 
their party in the conflict manifested in the ability to look at the conflict from a wider 
perspective, standing by the groups on the ‘enemy’ side in the specific situations of 
human rights and freedom abuse, and acting out of solidarity with colleagues on the 
other side characterizes mature peacebuilding CSOs. Serving as messengers between 
the authorities of Nagorny Karabakh conflict parties the leaders of the Helsinki Citizens 
Assembly and of the Society for Humanitarian Research demonstrated that not only 
they can listen to the other side’s story themselves, but promote communication 
between the leaderships.  
Joint Committee for Democratization and Conciliation (JCDC) leaders from Moldova 
regularly did shuttle diplomacy between the authorities and people of Moldova and 
Transnistria. Their non-nationalist attitude and openness to the search of political-
territorial solutions within the entire spectrum of options, including self-determination 
for Transnistria, gained the JCDC respect and opened doors on both sides of the 
conflict. 
 
Fostering cross-cutting professional, generational, gender, social, political and 
other identities disaggregates the parties and opens new avenues for building links 
between them 
The Peres Center carries out professional exchange and collaboration programs for 
Israelis and Palestinians, and large scale on-going mixed sports courses for the youth of 
the socially disadvantaged families on both sides. Caucasus Business and Development 
Network nurtures professional and social solidarity between SMEs. Designed with the 
purpose of creating a previously absent interface or expanding and anchoring it between 
the societies, these initiatives are a mindful alternative to casual encounters (Abu-Nimer 
1999) or cross-conflict initiatives that are not designed to change attitudes or create new 
joint institutions. 
 
Human rights protection of the disadvantaged in asymmetric conflicts promotes 
equalization of the parties in the peace process and sets the standard for the 
negotiated solution  
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The link between unconditional and universal respect for individual human rights and 
peace needs to be turned from an axiom to the hypothesis. This appears to be an 
effective theory of change for conflict prevention – indeed, societies where individual 
and collective rights are safeguarded and respected by all seem to be immune to grave 
societal conflicts. In the case when an asymmetric conflict where a more powerful side 
systematically oppresses a weaker side as is the case in the Israel-Palestine and 
Morocco-Western Sahara conflict, which creates incentives on the weaker side to 
restore balance by violence, human rights CSOs attempt to non-violently restore 
symmetry that is an imperative for the progression towards a negotiated solution and 
stable peace. Empowering the weak and confronting the powerful is regarded as a 
necessary step in the transformation of asymmetric conflicts (Lederach, 1995). It is only 
after the restoration of balance that genuine peace initiatives make take root. This is a 
theory of change in use by the Al-Haq in Palestine and Sahrawi and foreign human 
rights activists that advocate on behalf of the Sahrawi minority. Primacy of human 
rights is being promoted as a cornerstone of a negotiated solution. 
 
Non-violence as a conscious choice and anti-war movement as an alternative to 
militant rhetoric and violent behavior change the ratio between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ 
constituencies in favor of the latter 
The most notable are ex-combatants’ organizations and movements in the conflict 
zones. Combatants for Peace, a Palestinian-Israeli CSO, sets an example of protecting 
people without arms when accompanying Palestinian farmers to their agricultural lands 
amidst Jewish settlements and Israeli army outposts or by jointly creating safe 
playgrounds for children. Anti-violence protests and campaigns by Israeli and 
Palestinian civil society organizations were taking place across different phases of the 
conflict.  
 
3.2 Civil society capacity of peacebuilding CSOs in the implementation of their 
theories of change 
Theories of change ought to be applied in the societal and political realms in order to 
ensure change in the policies and politics, otherwise programmatically successful 
projects that do not add up their outcomes into peacebuilding advocacy “may generate a 
false consciousness of peaceful relations when the underlying processes are much more 
malign” (Clements 2004:3). CSOs that engage in peacebuilding in order to generate  
35 
 
social change ought to be political themselves or ally with and support specialized 
advocacy and activist groups.  
Political role of peacebuilding civil society is two-fold: 
1.  Civil society ensures the nexus between individual and societal transformation, 
between personal and political change 
2.  Civil society assumes the role of moderate political parties where the latter are 
absent and where politics is radicalized 
 
The following civil society strategies were identified as being adopted by the CSOs 
surveyed. 
 
Building and safeguarding organization’s credibility and legitimacy at home, 
across the conflict divide and internationally 
Peacebuilding activities by professional organizations that deliver high quality 
professional products (films, newspapers, legislation drafts, jobs, humanitarian, legal 
and financial assistance (including loans and grants for no-profits and SMEs) are better 
perceived by the public and authorities compared to the initiatives that do not deliver 
any products for which there is a demand in the society. More importantly, 
peacebuilding CSOs gain their credibility and popularity exactly because of their 
products, some of which may be related to peacebuilding, but often not. 
 
Independence of the authorities and principled position on other social and political 
issues within the society also solidifies a peacebuilding CSO’s legitimacy and 
credibility in the eyes of the society. For example, the leader of the Stepanakert Press-
Club raised the issue of non-transparent allocation of governmental funds to the public 
organizations in Nagorny Karabakh, started a campaign and as a result the authorities 
were forced to introduce the tender procedure.  
 
Working in meaningful partnerships is a pre-requisite for the accumulation of 
positive change and steady progression towards peace (Garcia, 2006). Coalition 
building within the civil society of the conflict sides, regionally and internationally is 
often seen as a strategy for achieving visible impact. Many of the surveyed CSOs were 
initiators of peacebuiding coalitions. Alliances and genuine partnerships with 
international NGOs provide additional strength and protection for carrying their 
peacebuilding initiatives to the political level.   
36 
 
Coalition building skills are very important for these coalitions to live and be effective. 
Discrepancy in the level of credibility, competence, acceptance by one or several sides 
of the conflict, organizational integrity and other factors ought to be carefully weighed 
before launching a coalition that are to produce political and societal effect. Some get 
institutionalized, while some others dissolve after having completed their task. The 
institutionalized ones usually have a stronger case to get officially recognized internal 
and international governmental structures as partners or as a force to be taken seriously 
in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
 
Political advocacy and lobbying was a strategy in use by all the surveyed CSOs. 
Participation in the legislative committees and various consultative bodies at the 
national and international level, involvement of parliamentarians and officials into the 
activities, direct campaigns, including pressure campaigns are in the armoury of the 
peacebuilding CSOs. 
 
Taking political posts, parliament, government – subsequently or parallel to the 
CSO position 
There is no consensus regarding the participation in formal politics. Some think that this 
is a positive step to leverage social and political change efforts by civil society, while 
some others think that acceptance by a civil society leader of a political or 
administrative post looks like cooptation and would undermine credibility of 
peacebuilding CSOs. Whether these moves would promote peacebuilding depends on 
the political context, maturity of civil society and personal integrity of the person in 
question. 
 
Educating donors is a strategy that is usually implemented in partnerships between 
international and within-the-conflict CSOs. Shifting a balance of power of expertise and 
decision making towards a more consultative and egalitarian funding strategy is an 
important direction of the CSOs from within-the-conflict and their outside civil society 
colleagues. 
 
Creating own funding structures 
Inaccessibility of the EU funds for local and grassroots CSOs and community groups 
whose role in peacebuilding is indispensable is regarded as an injustice. Hence 
independent funds are being created to serve the local level of peacebuilding. People’s  
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Peace Fund established by the Israeli and Palestinian peace activists is an example of 
the internally-driven and inward orientated support system. 
 
4. Professional cooperation between the EU and civil society: towards a new 
framework for the CSO peacebuilding impact assessment 
 
As mentioned above, there is a disconnect between the EU support for peacebuilding 
and direct interventions and peacebuilding by civil society on the peace as change 
versus peace as stability approach and on the notion of civil society as an institutional 
basis for peacebuilding. These two are the bases of the integrated peacebuilding 
framework. EU institutions have difficulties with the incorporation of these building 
blocks into their programmes and funding structure not least because of the 
bureaucratisation and of the vagueness of the Idealpolitik as a theory of change and 
limitations of, and inconsistency in, the application of the Realpolitik to force one or 
several conflict parties to soften their positions.  
 
4.1 Peace as stability versus peace as change 
Conflict resolution as it is regarded through the conceptual lens of the EU official 
institutions, is a finite process, of which a peace agreement is the climax because it 
marks the beginning of stable times as the ultimate desired state of affairs. A peace 
process then is a unidirectional movement that eradicates conflict, while conflict is 
viewed as a series of crises or one on-going crisis. Hence the EU conflict resolution 
strategy is predominantly a crisis response. With the creation of the IfS that replaced the 
RRM the situation has begun to change. Crisis preparedness aspect of the IfS received 
greater funding and timeframe of the project was expanded to 18 months that is still too 
short if weighted against the famous stance of the “two-hundred-year present” as a 
metaphor for the timeframe needed to repair damage done by a short war. Clearly the 
solution lies somewhere in between the two extremes of the parachuting crisis response 
and the Sisyphus option. 
 
Within the frame of reference where crisis and chaos is the only alternative to stability, 
the latter is naturally regarded as a precious commodity in the modern world. However 
stability is not tantamount to peace, because stability may mean the reproduction of the 
inward oppressive political regimes, persistent poverty and lack of economic and human 
development or disparities in the development in the interest of the dominant group, all 




Within the integrated peacebuilding framework (Lederach, 1997) and the systemic 
conflict transformation approach (Ropers, 2008), on the contrary, peacebuilding is a 
process-structure with a generational horizon, for which “the goal is not stasis, but 
rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes that maintain 
form over time and are able to adapt to environmental changes” (Lederach, 1997, p. 84). 
Peacebuilding dynamic maps onto the conflict dynamic and the two may be synergistic 
at times, while antagonistic at other times. Political and economic liberalization 
interventions interact with the conflict and peacebuilding in a number of constellations. 
Furthermore, the societies in conflict transform over time in various aspects and in 
various directions, which may have repercussions for the conflict: they undergo political 
regime changes and revolutions, experience demographic tides, are exposed to secluded 
or global economic shocks and environmental disasters. This is not to mention 
conscious conflict transformation efforts by domestic and outside agencies towards a 
peaceful and just resolution of the core and secondary issues and the overall transition 
from a war-system towards a peace-system.  
 
Civil society has the capacity to develop “peripheral vision”, or “the capacity to situate 
oneself in a changing environment with a sense of direction and purpose and at the same 
time develop and ability to see and move with the unexpected…. With the peripheral 
vision change processes have a flexible strength, never find dead ends that stop their 
movement, and relish complexity precisely because complexity never stops offering up 
new things that may create ways forward, around, or behind whatever jumps in the 
way” (Lederach 2005:119). This capacity is invaluable with regard to the constantly 
changing conflict context. The EU has serious limitations in its manoeuvring with 
regard to the redistribution of funds and speedy proposal processing. Incorporation of 
the “constant feedback loop” (Körppen 2006) into the EU policy and financing 
instruments is highly unlikely. Hence the recipient CSOs ought to be entrusted with 
greater flexibility in the project and program implementation in order to be able to 
adjust to the changing context and to exercise “serendipity” to maximize the effect of 
own efforts when the contexts turns out more favourable.  
 
4.2. Civil society as an institutional basis for peacebuilding 
Professional peacebuilding by civil society organizations is desirable and not 
objectionable as some suggest (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2007) if professionalization is  
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regarded as an antithesis to dilettantism. This concerns both international and local 
CSOs. Professional peacebuilding organizations operate in the mode of ‘reflective 
practitioner’ and build their interventions on the basis of theories and apply specific 
methods, while at the same time reflecting on the experience to amend and enrich the 
theoretical pool and perfect the methodology.  
 
Professional peacebuilding CSOs reach out to those who are hard to reach – political 
leaders, fighters, radical political parties, big business, otherwise peace practice turns 
into “preaching to the choir” activities. At the same time, if civil society does not 
expand the ranks of ‘peace constituency’ among the society at large either through 
involving more people into the orbit of its peacebuilding activities or through a 
multiplier such as television or the Internet, Lederach’s pyramid is inverted hence the 
peacebuilding is fragile and not sustainable.  
 
Professional peacebuilding CSOs work with all clusters that can be identified as having 
their own conflict experience, goals, ideology regarding conflict resolution methods, 
their level of motivation to act to approach a more peaceful and just state of society. 
Instead of classifying civil society actors in conflict as ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ it is more 
instructive to elicit to which collective needs they cater and which frustrated aspirations 
they voice. The ability of ‘civil’ society to constructively engage with ‘uncivil’ society 
in the dialogue, cross-conflict initiatives, and conflict sensitive development is an 
indicator of their maturity as peacebuilding agents
41. Within the professional 
peacebuilding the principle that “civil society needs to be civil and thus excludes groups 
that show uncivil behavior” (Paffenholz and Spurke 2006: 8) can do more harm than 
good to peace process, because those excluded on the grounds of being ‘uncivil’ may 
easily turn into ‘spoilers’ and undermine the most ‘civil’ peace efforts. People may fear 
peace made by the leaders on an unclear hence suspicious pretext. People may feel 
abandoned, betrayed and revengeful if violence and injustice that had been done to them 
was not addressed and justice was not compromised. People may simply not know any 
other way to live and make ends meet rather than warfare. Yet these people may be 
identifying themselves as civil society that advances a social cause and has a 
constituency.  
 
                                                 
41 For example, ex-combatants rehabilitation and re-socialization projects make many of them ardent 
peace activists     as was the case in Northern Ireland and Nicaragua  
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Finally, professional peacebuilding CSOs are capable of the promotion of social change. 
Their civil society capacity and power is fully mobilized for the promotion of unpopular 
ideas and approaches in a hostile or indifferent environment. The strategies involve 
modelling co-existence, public awareness raising, demonstration of their adherence to 
universal human rights principles, generating process and solution alternatives to the 
zero-sum game approach to the conflict and other advocacy avenues.  
 
4.3 Components of the new framework  
The new framework for the forecast and assessment of the impact of peacebuilding 
projects and longer-term strategies employed by CSOs in light of prospective 
cooperation with the EU should contain the following: 
Conflict context 
•  The class of the conflict 
•  The EU
42 support to Track I diplomacy and “soft power” application strategy 
Peacebuilding by civil society 
•  Theories of change. ‘Peacebuilding clusters’ within civil society needs to be 
delineated first. I propose that a ‘peacebuilding cluster’ is not a permanent 
membership club, but rather an open system that encompasses occasional 
projects by organizations that are not peacebuilding CSOs per se and have a 
different primary mandate and scope of operation (media peacebuilding projects, 
conflict-sensitive development, art for peace), thematic work by specialized 
CSOs that is a necessary and integral part of post-war peacebuilding (de-mining, 
refugee assistance, rehabilitation of ex-combatants, justice processes, trauma 
healing), and properly peacebuilding CSOs that have a more or less specialized 
area of activities. The criterion for the inclusion into the ‘peacebuilding cluster’ 
is an explicit or discernible theory of change. Theories of change ought to be 
assessed in the totality of all projects and initiatives on the ground. This task can 
be approximated by means of the analysis of theories of change in the 
conglomerate of projects funded by the same donor (Church and Shouldice 
2003), on a particular thematic dimension, or within each category of change 
(Mial 2004; Mitchell 2005). Thus overlooked and excessively elaborated areas 
would be identified and amendments to the strategic and targeted support for 
peacebuilding by civil society could be made. 
                                                 
42 This could be any inter-governmental organization, such as the UN or OSCE.  
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Civil society operation context 
•  Civil society maturity and capacity 
•  Historical/temporal relationship between civil society evolution and conflict 
•  Structure of the external (EU) support for civil society  
 
5. Conclusion 
A notable step in the direction of acknowledgement and partnership with peacebuilding 
CSOs was taken by the European Commission (EC) in the form of the establishment of 
the Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP) within the crisis preparedness of the IfS to channel 
targeted support to non-governmental organizations that specialize in peacebuilding. 
Irrespective of the clear budgetary emphasis in favour of crisis response compared to 
crisis preparedness where CSOs take the lead, this marks two important developments. 
First, peacebuilding is being recognized as a freestanding professional field that requires 
specialized funding mechanisms, just like the fields of development and human rights. 
Secondly, civil society organizations are recognized as institutions that are the 
depository of the required expertise and skills. It is important to stress that this 
happened to a large extent thanks to the diligent and focused advocacy by the European 
peacebuilding non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their coalition European 
Peace Liaison Office (EPLO), in particular. Conflict Prevention Partnership is an 
educational and consultative strategy by the European peacebuilding CSOs targeted at 
the EU institutions. EPLO advocates the inclusion of peacebuilding and the prevention 
of violent conflict by CSOs into the European Commission’s financing documents as an 
explicit goal and a funding priority. The establishment of the PbP is an important 
milestone in their advocacy work.  PbP is in its infancy and the first results of its work, 
in particular the funding procedure, received critical overview by the peacebuilding 
CSO community. A cumbersome EC proposal compilation procedure that PbP has to 
work through has been much commented on. The PbP department is currently under-
staffed, and the proposal of the international and European civil society peacebuilding 
CSOs to set up a Directorate for Peacebuilding is met with interest but with no 
enthusiasm. However, an even more pressing issue is the transfer and exchange of 
competence in the field of peacebuilding. A dialogue of equals between civil society 
groups and European officials and decision makers with the aim to set the agenda of the 
PbP is a significant breakthrough, and the idea of the institutionalization of this dialogue 
to the degree of shared decision making does not look as abstract now as it may have 
some years ago. These developments, even if very new and humble, indicate a slow but  
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sure movement on behalf of the EC towards the integrated framework for peacebuilding 
(Lederach 1999). Within this framework it is equally correct to say that civil society 
supports the EU peace efforts and that the EU supports civil society peace efforts. 
Conceptualization of within-the-conflict and outside-the-conflict CSOs as the 
institutional basis and organized change agent within the infrastructure for 
peacebuilding opens new horizons for the cooperation between the EU and civil society 
in the conflict-ridden parts of the European Neighbourhood. Keeping the infrastructure 
for peace functional is a mandate of civil society until the conflict becomes history. 
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